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Abstract 
When observing an ostracism episode, observers may wish to know whether ostracism is justified 
or not. If ostracism appears unjustified, observers will likely blame the sources and sympathize 
with the target; if it appears justified, observers will likely blame and devalue the target. Here we 
introduce the “social dissimilarity rule,” which holds that observers base their moral judgments on 
dissimilarities between the members of the observed group. In five studies, participants either 
recalled observed ostracism episodes or observed group interactions in which one group member 
was ostracized (e.g., in a chat or a group-working task). Results show that if similar persons 
exclude a dissimilar target (target is an “odd-one-out”), observers attribute ostracism to malicious 
motives of the ostracizers, such as ingroup favoritism, and devalue the ostracizers. However, if 
ostracism cannot be explained by social dissimilarity between the sources and the target, observers 
assume that the target is being punished for a norm deviation (punitive motive) and devalue the 
target. Use of the social dissimilarity rule was neither moderated by cognitive load (Study 3) nor 
by the perceived essentiality of the group distinction (Study 4). But if participants knew that the 
target previously deviated from a norm, knowledge about the situation had a stronger effect on 
moral judgments (Study 5) than social dissimilarity. These findings further our understanding of 
how observers make moral judgments about ostracism, which is important given that an observer’s 
moral judgment can strongly impact bystander behavior and thus target recovery and well-being. 
 
Keywords: Ostracism, Social Exclusion, Observation, Attribution, Punishment 
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Who’s to Blame?  
Dissimilarity as a Cue in Moral Judgments of Observed Ostracism Episodes 
No matter whether you think of, for instance, a child being ignored and excluded by his 
or her peers, a colleague from work not being asked to join for lunch, a homeless beggar 
deliberately being overlooked in the street, or maybe even a family member not being invited to 
gatherings because s/he always causes disagreements - social exclusion and ostracism can be 
observed everyday and in almost every social context. However, individuals’ reactions when 
observing social ostracism differ vastly. Sometimes, observers help and support the ostracized 
target, such as by inviting a colleague who has to sit alone during lunch to their own table. At 
other times, observers may choose not to get involved in the situation or even exclude the 
ostracized individual themselves. Taking into account the detrimental effects of ostracism on a 
variety of motivational, cognitive, affective, physiological, and behavioral variables (e.g., 
Williams, 2009), as well as the strong positive impact that social support and acknowledgement 
have on the well-being of ostracized targets (e.g., Eck, Schoel, & Greifeneder, 2016; Rudert, 
Hales, Greifeneder, & Williams, 2017; Rudert, Janke, & Greifeneder, 2017; Teng & Chen, 2012; 
Zhou & Gao, 2008), understanding when and why observers decide to support ostracized others 
is of high importance.  
The present contribution focuses on how observers of ostracism interpret and react to 
situations of social ostracism. We start from the assumption that individuals who observe an 
ostracism episode make an attribution about the underlying motives of the ostracizing group and 
then form a moral judgment about who is to blame. Two outcomes are particularly conceivable: 
on the one hand, ostracism can be attributed to a malicious motive. In this case, ostracism is likely 
judged as an inappropriate, unacceptable behavior of the ostracizing group, and observers therefore 
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       5 
derogate the ostracizing group and empathize with the target. On the other hand, ostracism can be 
attributed to a punitive motive, for instance, because the target’s behavior violates standard social 
norms. In this case, ostracism is likely judged as acceptable, and observers empathize with the 
ostracizing group, and derogate the target.  
Which of the two pathways is more likely is governed, for instance, by the observer’s 
knowledge of the situation or the characteristics of those involved in the ostracism episode. Here 
we focus on the latter, namely characteristics of those who ostracize (the sources) and 
characteristics of those who are ostracized (the targets). We argue that similarities or differences 
between apparent characteristics constitute a key social cue that individuals rely on in the absence 
of more diagnostic information. In what we refer to as the social dissimilarity rule, we state that 
when the target is dissimilar to the sources, observers tend to attribute ostracism to a malicious 
motive, derogate the sources, and empathize with the target. In contrast, when the social 
dissimilarity rule is not applicable (e.g., because the target is similar to the sources), observers tend 
to attribute ostracism to a punitive motive, derogate the target, and empathize with the sources. In 
what follows, we provide the theoretical background for this reasoning and detail the suggested 
hypotheses.  
Observing a Social Exclusion Episode: Malicious and Punitive Motives 
The first chain element in our argument holds that observers tend to perceive ostracism as 
being due to either a malicious or punitive motive. A malicious attribution means that ostracism 
is perceived as an inappropriate, unacceptable behavior by the ostracizing group. This attribution 
is likely to result from a strong shared default to include others, which prevails in many situations 
(Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016; Wesselmann, Wirth, Pryor, Reeder, & Williams, 2013). As a result 
of this default, observers will attribute ostracism to malicious motives of the sources, disapprove 
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of their behavior and side with the target. In line with this assumption, research has shown that 
observing ostracism in the virtual ball-throwing game Cyberball makes individuals feel 
uncomfortable and threatened as well as makes them empathize with the targets (Masten, Morelli, 
& Eisenberger, 2011; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009; Wesselmann, Williams, & Hales, 
2013; Will, Crone, van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013). Given the chance, observers even attempt to 
compensate the target, for instance, by directing more throws towards him/her (Wesselmann, 
Wirth, et al., 2013).  
However, other studies show that there are situations in which individuals attribute 
ostracism to a punitive motive of the sources, too. We define a punitive motive as being void of 
selfish or malicious desire, but instead reflecting the intent to either correct the target’s behavior 
or protect the group. If, for instance, the observers know that the ostracized target is a 
troublemaker, then excluding him or her may be perceived as a fair punishment. In this case, 
ostracism represents an apparently justified sanction of the target’s previous norm deviation with 
the aim to restore harmony in the group, strengthen the group norm, and discourage the 
troublemaker and/or other members from deviating from the norm as well (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 
2016; Kerr et al., 2009). Wesselmann and colleagues (2013) demonstrated empirical evidence for 
punitive ostracism, showing that observers’ support for the excluded target in Cyberball decreased 
when the target’s throws were slower than the other players’ throws. As soon as participants felt 
that the target was being a burden, they stopped compensating him/her and even joined the sources 
in ostracizing the target. In a follow-up study, the authors demonstrated that participants’ 
attributions for the slowness of an ostracized Cyberball-player varied, ranging from external 
attributions such as low speed of the target’s internet connection to internal attributions such as 
laziness of the target (Wesselmann, Williams, & Wirth, 2014). These findings are also in line with 
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Weiner’s attribution theory (Weiner, 2006), stating that especially when individuals attribute the 
occurrence of a negative event to the target’s behavior (e.g., the target did not invest enough effort), 
the target is perceived as responsible for the event (see also Arpin, Froehlich, Lantian, Rudert, & 
Stelter, 2017). 
Attributing Motives When There is Little Diagnostic Information 
In previous studies that investigated possible reasons for ostracism, participants usually 
knew whether an individual has transgressed against a group norm before, because they were part 
of the group themselves and witnessed the target deviating from the norm (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 
2016; Gooley, Zadro, Williams, Svetieva, & Gonsalkorale, 2015; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 
2013). However, in real life, observers of ostracism often lack relevant information about the 
situation or the target, especially when the observer is not even a part of the respective group. 
Observers may also not be able to fully process an ostracism situation due to limited motivation as 
well as cognitive capacity (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). To illustrate, think of a teacher who is 
monitoring the schoolyard during a recess and observes a group of unknown children ostracizing 
another unknown child. Given that she has no information about the group or the previous history, 
how would she make a judgment about whether she should intervene or not? 
Hence, the second chain element in our argument entails that individuals making a moral 
judgment about observed ostracism episodes will base this judgment on the presence of apparent 
reasons for excluding others, which may or may not justify ostracism in the eye of the observer. 
In situations in which valid episodic information is sparse or missing, observers likely make use 
of heuristics and social stereotypes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994). Initial evidence for this was provided by Rudert, Reutner, Greifeneder, and 
Walker (2017), who have demonstrated that the facial appearance of target can influence 
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observer’s moral judgments, such that ostracizing cold and incompetent looking individuals is 
perceived as more acceptable. In the present research, we propose that social dissimilarity between 
the members of the observed group may serve as another heuristic.  
Observed Situation: The Target is Ostracized by Dissimilar Others 
We assume that observers will attribute ostracism to a malicious motive, namely 
discrimination, when they see a dissimilar person being ostracized by two similar others. This is 
because individuals have stereotypical conceptions of prejudice and discrimination (Inman & 
Baron, 1996) as well as lay theories and expectations with regard to intergroup conflicts and 
biases (Sommers & Norton, 2006; Vivian & Berkowitz, 1992) from an early age (McKown & 
Weinstein, 2003). Thus, if observers notice that a rather homogeneous group ostracizes a 
dissimilar person, one obvious attribution is that the sources are showing ingroup favoritism, and 
disadvantage an outgroup member. As a consequence of this attribution, we propose that 
observers will evaluate ostracism as unfair. This is because individuals generally try to avoid 
being seen as prejudiced (Moss‐Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010), and tend to perceive openly 
prejudiced persons such as racists in a highly negative way (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 
2002; Sommers & Norton, 2006). Thus, if the sources are similar and the target is dissimilar 
from the sources, we assume that observers tend to assume a malicious motive, devalue the 
sources, and express sympathy for the ostracized target, because it is wrong to ostracize someone 
just because she/he is the odd-one-out.  
Observed Situation: The Target is Ostracized by Similar Others 
If the target is ostracized by one or more similar others, the social dissimilarity rule is 
inapplicable, and thus, observers need an alternative explanation. We argue that, given a 
sufficiently ambiguous situation, observers will assume that the target is excluded because s/he 
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committed some norm transgression and is now being punished for it. This attribution is in line 
with research on the Black Sheep Effect, which states that ingroup members strongly derogate and 
reject members from their own group who deviate from norms (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, 
Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Such an attribution may further be self-serving for observers. This is 
because in highly ambiguous situations, it may be safer to be on the side of the (excluding) majority 
than risk siding with a potentially deviant target. Thus, we predict that if the social dissimilarity 
rule cannot be applied to an exclusion situation, observers will tend to blame and devalue the target 
for his/her current situation.  
Overview of the Present Research 
In the present contribution, we test the influence of (dis)similarity on observers’ 
attributions and evaluations in ambiguous ostracism situations. In particular, we measure two 
different attributions: malicious and punitive attributions. Evaluation of target and sources is 
assessed as the amount of blame, anger, sympathy and interest in cooperating with the respective 
evaluated person. We assume that observers draw inferences based on the social dissimilarity 
rule: if the ostracized target is an “odd-one-out,” that is, dissimilar to the ostracizing sources, 
observers tend to attribute ostracism to ingroup favoritism and malicious motives of the sources. 
As a consequence, observers will sympathize with the target and devalue the sources. In contrast, 
if the target does not seem to be an “odd-one-out,” the social dissimilarity rule cannot be applied. 
As a result, observers tend to assume that the target violated a social norm, attribute ostracism to 
a punitive motive, and consequently blame and devalue the target instead.  
We test these conjectures in five studies. In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigate which 
attributions individuals spontaneously make for observed ostracism and thus asked participants 
to describe ostracism situations that they had observed in real life. These reasons were then 
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coded by independent raters (Study 1a) and four of them were evaluated by another group of 
participants (Study 1b). In the subsequent studies, we manipulated similarity, using vignettes 
(Studies 2 and 3) as well as a newly developed experimental chatroom paradigm (Studies 4 and 
5) to create an ostracism situation. Similarity between the agents was manipulated via support of 
fictitious soccer teams (Studies 2 and 3), ethnic background and hairstyle (Study 4), and 
nationality (Study 5). Studies 2 - 4 test whether the effect of similarity on evaluation is mediated 
via attributions to a malicious or a punitive motive. Studies 3 and 4 additionally test whether 
cognitive load and perceived essentiality of the group affects observers’ use of the social 
dissimilarity rule. Finally, to test the boundary conditions of the social dissimilarity rule, in 
Study 5 we investigate whether observers still apply the social dissimilarity rule when they have 
a more informative cue, namely knowledge about the history of the situation.  
Study 1a 
An important premise of our theoretical assumptions is that individuals perceive 
dissimilarity of the ostracized target as a plausible explanation for ostracism in certain situations. 
Thus, in a first, preliminary study we assessed which attributions individuals spontaneously 
make for observed ostracism, or more specifically, how frequently individuals attribute observed 
ostracism episodes to the ostracized target being an “odd-one-out.” To do so, we recruited 30 
US-American participants (15 females, Mage = 33.34, SD = 11.40) from Prolific Academic for a 
payment of £0.50 and asked them to describe a situation in which they observed another person 
being ignored and excluded. We further asked participants to state the reasons why they thought 
this specific person was ignored and excluded. Below are two examples of answers that 
participants provided: 
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“The last time I can remember someone being purposely ignored and excluded was in 
elementary school. I went to a small parochial school. There was a boy in my grade who had 
some cognitive issues and since it was such a small school, his differences were amplified. 
Looking back, he likely had severe ADD along with some other issues affecting behavior. He 
rarely was invited to birthday parties and often sat alone at lunch. He was very different from the 
rest of the students, and since we were all in such a bubble, most people were cruel to him.” 
 
“In highschool there was a girl that had wanted to join our group project but the group 
did not want her to be. Our group was most familiar to her as she used to be welcome. She did 
not know many others in the class and had to group with unfamiliar people. Our group ignore 
[sic] her and did not let her join. This girl had previously been part of our group, however she 
burned that bridge when she talked behind another person's back and shared some secrets. No 
one trusted her after.” 
 
Answers were coded by two independent raters, who were blind to the research question, 
with respect to the following categories: “target was different,” “target behaved inappropriately,” 
“other reason,” (Cohen’s Kappa = .75, a “substantial agreement” according to Landis & Koch, 
1977). The reason for ostracism that was most frequently chosen by both raters was that the 
ostracized target was dissimilar from the others (Rater 1: 67%; Rater 2: 57%), followed by the 
ostracized target behaving inappropriately (Rater 1: 27%; Rater 2: 30%). Thus, it seems that 
individuals attribute ostracism frequently to the fact that the ostracized person is dissimilar to the 
rest of the group. However, they also seem to be aware that ostracism can be due to punishment 
for norm violations. 
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Study 1b 
We further assumed that individuals would judge it as wrong to ostracize an individual 
just because s/he is dissimilar, but would perceive ostracism as more acceptable when the target 
had previously committed a norm violation. More specifically, ostracism due to a norm violation 
should be perceived as more justified than ostracism due to dissimilarities. Moreover, individuals 
who observe a norm-violating target being ostracized should be more angry and less sympathetic 
towards the target as well as less angry and less sad about the situation compared to when the 
target has not violated any norms. To test this assumption, we selected four of the situations that 
individuals had described and presented them to a new group of participants. 
Methods 
We recruited 50 participants (25 females, Mage = 34.28, SD = 12.52) from Prolific 
Academic for a payment of £0.50. Sample size was calculated to detect medium-sized main 
effects of the two different reasons for ostracism on a single dependent variable (d = .50, power 
= .90, required n = 44). All participants read two of the situations from Study 1a that had been 
coded by both raters as “target violates a social norm” (constituting a reason for a punitive 
motive), and two situations that had been coded by both raters as “target is the odd-one-out.” 
(constituting a reason for a malicious motive). The four scenarios were chosen because they 
seemed well-suited to represent ostracism due to a norm violation versus dissimilarity, plus they 
all had in common that they referred to ostracism among children or adolescents. After reading a 
scenario, participants rated the respective scenario on the following five items “I think it was 
justified that the person was ignored and excluded,” “I feel sympathy with the ignored and 
excluded person,” “I feel angry with the ignored and excluded person,” “The situation makes me 
feel angry,” and “The situation makes me feel sad” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).  
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Results 
A MANOVA on all five evaluation items with all four situations as repeated measures 
revealed that the situations differed significantly in evaluation, F(3, 47) = 19.24, p < .001, η2 = 
.39. We specified contrasts, testing the two situations that were coded as due to the target 
committing a norm violation against the two situations that were coded as due to the target being 
dissimilar from the group (1 1 -1 -1). In line with our assumptions, reading a scenario in which 
the target was excluded because of a norm violation resulted in participants evaluating ostracism 
as more justified, F(1, 49) = 253.17, p < .001, η2 = .84, compared to reading a scenario in which 
the target was excluded because s/he was dissimilar from the group. Regarding the evaluation of 
the target, participants felt more anger, F(1, 49) = 8.06, p = .007, η2 = .14, and less sympathy, 
F(1, 49) = 120.42, p < .001, η2 = .56, with the excluded and ignored person when reading the 
norm-violating compared to the dissimilarity scenarios. Regarding the evaluation of the situation, 
ostracism due to a norm violation made participants feel less angry, F(1, 49) = 110.31, p < .001, 
η2 = .70, and sad, F(1, 49) = 124.99, p < .001, η2 = .72 than ostracism due to the target being 
dissimilar from the group. For the descriptive statistics, see Table 1. 
Discussion 
Studies 1a and 1b provide first evidence for our assumption that individuals commonly 
conceive ostracism situations in terms of two prominent attributions: (1) ostracism is perceived 
to result from the target being an odd-one-out (malicious ostracism); (2) ostracism is perceived 
as a punishment of the target for a norm violation (punitive ostracism). The majority of ostracism 
situations that participants recalled from their real lives could be assigned to one of the two 
reasons. In the follow-up Study 1b, another group of participants evaluated ostracism due to a 
norm violation as more justified and reported that they felt more angry and less sympathetic with 
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the target. Moreover, they were less angry and sad about these situations than about the 
situations in which a target was ostracized due to being the odd-one-out.  
The two studies indicate that observers distinguish between punitive and malicious 
attributions for ostracism in real life. Also, observers seem to base their moral judgment on these 
attributions, insofar that ostracism situations that are attributed to a punitive motive are evaluated 
as more acceptable than ostracism situations that are attributed to a malicious motive. These 
findings lay the foundation for the subsequent studies, in which we present participants with an 
ostracism situation and manipulate dissimilarity in an experimental setting. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was a vignette study, which aimed to find evidence for the social dissimilarity 
rule. We presented participants with different vignettes, in which either the target, or one of the 
sources, or no one was the odd-one-out. In line with our assumptions, we expected that when the 
target was the odd-one-out, participants would attribute ostracism to a malicious motive of the 
sources and devalue the sources as a consequence. When the target was not the odd-one-out, we 
expected participants to attribute ostracism to a punitive motive of the sources and devalue the 
target as a consequence. 
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (US Americans only, HIT Approval Rate greater than 96) for a payment of $0.75. We 
calculated the sample size such as to detect a medium-sized similarity x evaluated person 
interaction effect on a single dependent variable (f = .25, power = .80, required n = 120). One 
hundred and fifty-two participants finished the questionnaire (62 females, Mage = 35.59, SD = 
12.51). Participants were randomly assigned to three similarity conditions: the target as the odd-
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one-out, one of the sources as the odd-one-out, or no odd-one-out. Because the target is the odd-
one-out in the first condition only, we expected to find attribution to a punitive motive and 
devaluation of the target in both the sources as the odd-one-out and the no odd-one-out 
conditions.   
Materials and procedure. Participants were told that they would be presented with a 
specific part of an interaction sequence between three football fans and that their task would be 
to evaluate the interaction between the three persons. Next, participants were presented with 
three football fans called Michael (the target), Peter, and Tom (the sources), and the teams these 
fans ostensibly supported. To manipulate social similarity, one third of the participants were told 
that Peter and Tom supported Team Blue while Michael supported Team Red, so that the sources 
were similar and the target was the odd-one-out. Another third was told that both Michael and 
Tom supported Team Blue, while Peter supported Team Red, so that the target and one of the 
sources were similar and the other source was the odd-one-out. The remaining third was told that 
all three football fans supported Team Blue (no odd-one-out).  
Participants were further told that the three football fans had played a cooperation game 
first. Participants were not informed about the game’s outcome, though, so that the social 
situation was highly ambiguous: Although observing participants knew that the group had 
interacted before, they had no idea about how this interaction went. Ostensibly, right after the 
cooperation game, each of the three football fans had had the option to decide whether he wanted 
to work together with the others in a subsequent group task or not. Participants were then 
presented with the ostensible choices of the three persons: While the target stated that he had no 
preferences, the sources both declared that they did not want to work together with the target.  
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       16 
Participants evaluated all three football fans on the dependent variables. Blame was 
assessed by asking: “Please indicate for each person how likely you think it is that he set the 
events in motion that eventually resulted in the choices about the group task.” (1 = not likely at 
all, 7 = very likely). Moreover, participants were asked: “Assuming you had to play the 
cooperation game yourself: How much would you like to play with each of the three persons?” 
as well as “I feel angry about [name]’s behavior” and ” I can sympathize with [name]” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very much; items for anger and sympathy derived from Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 
2013). The evaluations for the sources were averaged separately for each variable (Spearman’s ρ 
= .95 - .97). 
Additionally, we assessed attributions that participants made about the observed 
exclusion situation. We presented participants with six statements, each starting with “I think 
that…” Attribution to a punitive motive was assessed with the following three items: “…Michael 
has acted unfairly in the previous cooperation task”, “…Peter and Tom intended to punish 
Michael because of his behavior in the cooperation game”, and “…it is Michael’s own fault how 
Peter and Tom treat him”, (1 = I do not agree at all, 7 = I agree very much; Cronbach’s α = .73). 
To assess attribution due to a malicious motive, we asked: “…Peter and Tom are just mean to 
Michael, absent proper reason.” “…Michael cannot be blamed for how Peter and Tom treat 
him” “…Peter and Tom treat Michael the way they do because of the football team he 
supports.” (Cronbach’s α = .78). 
Finally, to check whether participants had understood the presented material correctly, we 
asked them: “According to the three persons' choices, which person will probably have to work 
alone in the subsequent group task?” and “Which football teams did the three persons support?” 
For research questions unrelated to the present framework, we further assessed dispositional 
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measures such as observer justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010) as 
well as empathy (Davis, 1983). After providing demographic information, participants were 
thanked and paid. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. All participants reported correctly that the target would have to 
work alone in the subsequent group task. Moreover, 93% of the participants (i.e., 141 out of 152) 
correctly restated which team each football fan favored.1 
Dependent variables. A 3 (odd-one-out: target vs. source vs. no one) x 2 (evaluation: 
target vs. sources) MANOVA on blame, interest in cooperation, anger and sympathy revealed a 
significant main effect for the evaluation, Wilks’ λ = .793, F(4, 146) = 9.53, p < .001, η2 = .21, 
reflecting that the target was evaluated differently from the sources. There was no significant 
main effect of the odd-one-out, F < 1. Most importantly, the hypothesized odd-one-out x 
evaluation interaction was significant, Wilks’ λ = .876, F(8, 292) = 2.46, p = .014, η2 = .06. 
To further examine the interaction effect, a series of planned follow-up ANOVAs as well 
as simple main effects analyses for each of the dependent variables were conducted. The 
hypothesized interaction effect was significant for every dependent variable (Blame: F(1, 149) = 
8.71, p < .001, η2 =.11; Interest in Cooperation: F(1, 149) = 6.26, p = .002, η2 =.08; Anger: F(1, 
149) = 4.48, p = .013, η2 =.06; Sympathy: F(1, 149) = 6.45, p = .002, η2 =.08). Consistent with 
hypotheses, we found that if the target was the odd-one-out, the sources were blamed more, p = 
.004, d = .65 and p = .002, d = .71, and evoked more anger, p = .033, d = .50 and p = .068, d = 
.46, as well as less sympathy, p = .190, d = .38 and p = .032, d = .49, compared to the other two 
conditions where the target was not the odd-one-out. In the condition where the target was the 
odd-one-out, he was also blamed less, p = .004, d = .63 and p = .003, d = .70, and participants 
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were more sympathetic, p = .020, d = .53 and p = .005, d = .67, and more interested in 
cooperating with him, p = .009, d = .59 and p = .002, d = .71.  
Within-subject comparisons were conceptually analogous to the between-subjects 
analyses, insofar that when the target was the odd-one-out, the sources were devalued more than 
the target, while in the two conditions where the target was not the odd-one-out, the target was 
devalued more than the sources. For the descriptive statistics and a display of the pattern, see 
Table 2 and Figure 1. 
To investigate the attributions that participants made, we ran a 3 (odd-one-out: target vs. 
source vs. no one) x 2 (attribution: malicious vs. punitive) ANOVA, with attribution as a 
repeated measure. There were significant main effects for the odd-one-out, F(2, 149) = 3.57, p = 
.031, η2 = .05 and for attribution, F(1, 149) = 11.18, p = .001, η2 = .07, which were both qualified 
by the hypothesized interaction, F(2, 149) = 22.86, p < .001, η2 = .24. Participants attributed 
ostracism less strongly to a punitive and more strongly to a malicious motive when the target was 
the odd-one-out compared to the other two conditions, all p < .001, smallest d = .79. Within-
condition comparisons further revealed that when the target was the odd-one-out, participants 
attributed ostracism more strongly to a punitive motive than to a malicious motive, and vice 
versa in the other two conditions, all p < .001, smallest d = .47. 
Mediation via attribution. We hypothesized that the effect of the different similarity 
constellations on the evaluation of the football fans is mediated by different attributions of the 
situation. More specifically, we assumed that if the target is the odd-one-out, then observers will 
more strongly attribute ostracism to a malicious motive and less strongly to a punitive motive, 
and consequently devalue the sources. In contrast, if the target is not the odd-one-out, observers 
will more strongly attribute ostracism to a punitive motive and less strongly to a malicious 
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motive, and thus devalue the target. To test the condition of interest (target as odd-one-out) 
against the other two conditions, we dummy coded the conditions (odd-one-out: target = 1, other 
two conditions = 0) and used this dummy variable as the predictor. As mediators, we 
simultaneously tested the influence of the punitive and the malicious attribution measures. As 
criteria, we inserted blame, interest in cooperation, anger, and sympathy for the target and the 
sources respectively (i.e., eight variables in total). We tested mediation processes with MPLUS 
Version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017), using the maximum likelihood estimator with 
bootstrapping (5,000 bootstrap estimates). The mediation model was saturated, since we allowed 
for all possible relationships between the variables. 
The direct path coefficients with 90% confidence intervals are displayed in Table 3. 
When the target was the odd-one-out, compared to the combined other two conditions, 
participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious motive, and as a result of this 
attribution, evaluated the target more positively, that is, they blamed the target less, βindirect = -
.19, 90% confidence interval (CI) = [-.30; -.09], were more interested in cooperating with him, 
βindirect = .28, 90% CI = [.18, .38], were less angry, βindirect = -.10, 90% CI = [- .17; -.03] and more 
sympathetic towards the target, βindirect = .25, 90% CI = [.15; .36]. Moreover, participants also 
evaluated the sources more negatively, that is, they blamed the sources more, βindirect = .31, 90% 
CI = [.21; .41], were less interested in cooperating with them, βindirect = -.18, 90% CI = [-.28; -
.09], were more angry, βindirect = .34, 90% CI = [.22; .46], and less sympathetic towards them, 
βindirect = -.12, 90% CI = [-.20; -.04], compared to the other two conditions.  
Inversely, when the source or no one was the odd-one-out, compared to the target being 
the odd-one-out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a punitive motive, and as a 
result of this attribution, evaluated the target more negatively, that is, they blamed the target 
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more, βindirect = -.14, 90% CI = [-.23; -.08], were less interested in cooperating with him, βindirect = 
.12, 90% CI = [.06; .20], were more angry, βindirect = -.24, 90% CI = [-.34; -.15] and less 
sympathetic towards the target, βindirect = .12, 90% CI = [.06; .20]. Moreover, participants 
evaluated the sources more positively, that is, they were more interested in cooperating with the 
sources, βindirect = -.13, 90% CI = [-.20; -.07], and more sympathetic towards them, βindirect = -.20, 
90% CI = [-.28; -.13], compared to the other two conditions.  
Discussion 
Study 2 provides initial support for our hypothesis that in ambiguous situations, observers 
make use of the social dissimilarity rule to make a moral judgment about the situation: When the 
target of ostracism was the “odd-one-out” within the group, then participants tended to blame the 
target less and perceived him as more attractive for cooperation than the sources. Moreover, the 
target evoked less anger and more sympathy than the sources. Mediation analysis suggests that 
this might be due to ostracism being attributed to malicious motives of the sources, with 
malicious motives being presumably fueled by ingroup favoritism. In contrast, the effect 
dissipated and even partially reversed when the social dissimilarity rule was not applicable 
because the target was not the “odd-one-out”: sources were now seen as more interesting 
cooperation partners and blamed less; moreover, the sources evoked more sympathy and less 
anger. Mediation analysis indicated that this might be because ostracism was attributed to a 
punitive motive: Participants more strongly considered the possibility that the target had acted 
unfairly during the first task and thus was ostracized by the two sources to punish this norm-
violating behavior. 
Study 3 
Study 3 had two purposes: First, we intended to replicate our findings from Study 2 with 
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a different sample and in a more controlled setting. Thus, instead of an online sample, we 
conducted an experiment in the laboratory. Second, we aimed to gather more evidence for the 
hypothesized process: According to our theoretical assumptions, using the social dissimilarity 
rule represents a form of heuristic processing or cognitive shortcut, which is used especially in 
ambiguous situations without sufficient information. Because heuristics can operate with a 
minimum of cognitive resources, they can be used when individuals do not have the time or 
motivation to acquire or weigh potentially more complex information (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Macrae, et al., 1994; Rudert, Reutner, et al., 2017).  
In contrast to the here hypothesized heuristic processing, one could alternatively plead the 
case that similarity is used as input in systematic processing. In this case, individuals would 
actively consider similarity and deliberately contemplate its implications. If similarity is used 
deliberately, however, more processing will be needed compared to heuristic reliance. To put 
these competing processing assumptions to the test, we imposed cognitive load on participants. 
A differential pattern of results as a function of cognitive load may be interpreted as an 
indication of a more deliberative process; a similar pattern of results as an indication of a 
heuristic process.  
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were 101 psychology students who participated for 
course credit. One person did not want his/her data to be analyzed, so that the final sample 
consisted of 100 participants (87 females, Mage = 22.80, SD = 6.41). Note that sample size was 
smaller than intended (power analysis based on a three-way interaction effect on a single 
dependent variable; f = .25; power = .80; required n = 136), due to the fact that not enough 
participants signed up for the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (odd-one-
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out: target vs. source) x 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) factorial design. We focused on only two 
odd-one-out conditions because our main interest was in the group for which the social 
dissimilarity rule would be applicable: the group with the similar sources and the odd-one-out 
target. 
Materials and procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 2. In addition, before 
each dependent variable, participants were asked to memorize either an 8-digit number (high 
cognitive load) or a two-digit number (low cognitive load) in 10 s (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; 
Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). Participants recalled the respective numbers directly after answering 
each dependent variable, and then were provided with the next number to memorize. Assessment 
in the laboratory ensured that participants could not write down the numbers and thus nullify the 
cognitive load manipulation. As a manipulation check for cognitive load, we assessed three items 
such as “Memorizing the number posed a strong demand on my attention” (9-point scale, do not 
agree – agree; Cronbach’s α = .86; see Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Ninety-one percent of the participants reported correctly that the 
target would have to work alone in the subsequent group task. Moreover, 95% of the participants 
correctly restated which team each football fan favored. In the low-cognitive load condition only 
three participants (out of 50) made errors when memorizing the two-digit numbers, while in the 
high-cognitive load condition, only three participants out of 50 managed to restate all four eight-
digit numbers correctly. Importantly, participants in the high load condition reported 
significantly higher strain than participants in the low load condition, t(87.14) = -8.33, p < .001, 
d = 1.78 (M = 5.60, SD = 2.18 vs. M = 2.47, SD = 1.51). 
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Dependent variables. A 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. source) x 2 (cognitive load: high vs. 
low) x 2 (evaluation: target vs. sources) MANOVA on blame, interest in cooperation, anger and 
sympathy revealed a significant main effect for the evaluation, Wilks’ λ = .645, F(4, 93) = 12.78, 
p < .001, η2 = .36, indicating that in general, the target was evaluated more positively than the 
sources. Moreover, the hypothesized odd-one-out x evaluation interaction was significant, 
Wilks’ λ = .791, F(4, 93) = 6.16, p = .014, η2 = .21. There was no significant main effect of the 
odd-one-out, cognitive load or any interaction with cognitive load, smallest p = .307. 
A series of planned follow-up ANOVAs for each of the dependent variables showed that 
the hypothesized odd-one-out x evaluation interaction effect was significant for every dependent 
variable, (Blame: F(1, 96) = 9.89, p = .002, η2 = .09; Interest in Cooperation: F(1, 96) = 19.92, p 
< .001, η2 = .17; Anger: F(1, 96) = 6.77 p = .011, η2 = .07; Sympathy: F(1, 96) = 17.26 p < .001, 
η2 = .15. Simple main effects analyses showed that when the target was the odd-one-out, 
participants blamed the sources more, p = .001, d = .70, were less interested in cooperating with 
them, p = .001, d = .66, and reported more anger, p = .050, d = .39, and less sympathy for the 
sources, p < .001, d = .73, compared to when one of the sources was the odd-one-out. Moreover, 
participants tended to blame the target less, p = .015, d = .48, and were more sympathetic, p = 
.002, d = .62, and more interested in cooperating with him, p < .001, d = .76.  
Within-subject comparisons were conceptually analogous to the between-subjects 
analyses, insofar that when the target was the odd-one-out, the sources were devalued more than 
the target and when one of the sources was the odd-one-out, the target was devalued more than 
the sources. For the descriptive statistics, see Table 4. 
A 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. source) x 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) x 2 (attribution: 
malicious vs. punitive) ANOVA with attribution as a repeated measure showed a significant 
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main effect for odd-one-out, F(1, 96) = 8.62, p = .004, η2 = .08 and the attribution, F(1, 96) = 
8.97, p = .003, η2 = .09, which were both qualified by the hypothesized interaction, F(1, 96) = 
73.98, p < .001, η2 = .44. Cognitive load had no significant effect, F < 1. Participants attributed 
ostracism less strongly to a punitive motive, p < .001, d = 1.17, and more strongly to a malicious 
motive, p < .001, d = 1.82, when the target was the odd-one-out compared to when a source was. 
Within-condition comparisons showed that when the target was the odd-one-out, participants 
attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious motive than to a punitive motive, p < .001, d = 
1.30 and vice versa when a source was the odd-one-out, p < .001, d = .51. 
Mediation via attribution. We ran the same two mediation analyses as in Study 2; see 
Table 5 for the direct path coefficients. When the target was the odd-one-out, compared to the 
source being the odd-one-out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious 
motive, and as a result of this attribution, evaluated the target partly more positively, that is, they 
were more interested in cooperating with the target, βindirect = .18, 90% CI = [.04, .31] and were 
more sympathetic towards the target, βindirect = .20, 90% CI = [.05; .35]. Moreover, participants 
evaluated the sources more negatively, that is, they blamed the sources more, βindirect = .18, 90% 
CI = [.04; .36], were less interested in cooperating with them, βindirect = -.18, 90% CI = [-.33; .05], 
were more angry, βindirect = .44, 90% CI = [.28; .62], and less sympathetic towards them, βindirect = 
-.26, 90% CI = [-.45; -.09], compared to when a source was the odd-one-out.  
Inversely, when a source was the odd-one-out, compared to the target being the odd-one-
out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a punitive motive, and as a result of this 
attribution, evaluated the target more negatively, that is, they blamed the target more, βindirect = -
.14, 90% CI = [-.23; -.02], were less interested in cooperating with him, βindirect = .29, 90% CI = 
[.20; .40], were more angry, βindirect = -.26, 90% CI = [-.40; -.16] and less sympathetic towards 
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the target, βindirect = .23, 90% CI = [.13; .34]. Moreover, participants were more sympathetic 
towards the sources, βindirect = -.11, 90% CI = [-.22; -.02], compared to when a source was the 
odd-one-out.  
Discussion 
Study 3 replicates the results of Study 2 in a laboratory setting: As in Study 2, the factor 
odd-one-out affected observers’ attributions regarding a social exclusion episode and 
consequently their evaluation of target and sources. Also, the effect of the odd-one-out on 
evaluations was mediated via a punitive or a malicious attribution of ostracism. In addition to the 
factor odd-one-out, we manipulated cognitive load while participants reported their attributions 
and evaluations. However, we found neither a main effect nor an interaction of cognitive load 
with odd-one-out on observers’ moral judgment. This suggests that individuals are capable of 
using the social dissimilarity rule under cognitive strain. Albeit being, strictly speaking, a test of 
the null hypothesis, this finding is very much in line with the hypothesized heuristic nature of the 
social dissimilarity rule. 
It should be noted that statistical power was lower than desired in Study 3. However, the 
hypothesized odd-one-out x evaluation interaction was still significant. As for a potential effect 
of cognitive load or any interaction with cognitive load, the descriptive data is not even 
suggestive of an interaction pattern, rendering it unlikely that sufficient power would have led to 
significant p-values.  
As a potential caveat, it should be noted that cognitive load was manipulated when 
participants answered the dependent variables, but not when the ostracism situation was 
presented. Thus, there is the possibility that participants formed their moral judgment 
immediately when reading and encoding the scenario, that is, before our manipulation of 
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cognitive load. Although this caveat should not be taken lightly, the alternative methodological 
approach of manipulating cognitive load before scenario presentation would have been much 
more problematic, since it might have interfered with participants’ reading and thus their general 
understanding of the scenario, creating different social constructions to begin with.  
Study 4 
Both Studies 2 and 3 used scenarios. While providing a good initial test of the social 
dissimilarity rule, the scenario approach has several downsides, such as that it represents a 
relatively abstract setting in which no information aside from similarity is available. To address 
this concern, we developed a novel paradigm in which participants observed ostracism in a more 
realistic setting, namely by reading an excerpt of an alleged chatroom discussion between three 
discussants. In this excerpt, the contributions and opinions of one person are being ignored. In 
addition to “cyberostracism” being a common and realistic occurrence (Vorderer & Schneider, 
2016; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams et al., 2002), ostracism in online 
communication settings, such as chatrooms, mobile phone communication as well as social 
media platforms, has already been successfully employed in several studies focusing on the 
target’s perspective (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Smith & Williams, 2004; Wolf et al., 
2014). For the present research, a chatroom paradigm further offers the advantage that 
participants potentially have the chance to form a moral judgment based on multiple cues, such 
as the contributions of the discussants. These contributions did not clearly point to the reasons 
for ostracism, however, since we intended to keep the observed situation ambiguous.  
Aside from introducing the chatroom paradigm, Study 4 additionally investigates whether 
the essentiality of the similarity distinction moderates the effect of similarity on moral judgment. 
This manipulation resulted from the following consideration: not all similarities are equal in the 
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meaning and importance that people ascribe to them. We wanted to know whether ascriptions of 
blame and moral judgment require similarity to be deeply rooted, that is, based on something that 
individuals perceive as an essential distinction, rather than just a superficial coincidence. 
Building on research about the perceived essentiality of group distinctions, we decided for ethnic 
background or race as a distinction which is typically perceived as one of the most essential 
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007). As a non-essential distinction, we 
manipulated the different hairstyles of the discussants and additionally provided participants with 
the information that the discussants were styled as a part of the experiment and thus did not 
choose the hairstyles themselves. 
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (US Americans only, HIT Approval Rate greater than 97) for a payment of $0.80. Two 
persons did not want their data to be analyzed. We calculated the sample size such as to detect a 
medium-sized similarity x essentiality x evaluated person interaction effect on a single dependent 
variable (f = .25, power = .90, required n = 172) and recruited 205 participants. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. source) x 2 (essentiality distinction: essential 
vs. non-essential) factorial design. Due to a technical error, in one subgroup the agents’ portraits 
were not displayed to participants, so that 14 participants had to be taken out of the sample (1/3 
of the essential distinction & target as odd-one-out condition). Thus, the final sample consisted 
of 191 participants (82 females, 1 other, Mage = 35.91, SD = 10.90). Because of relevance for the 
present study, we also assessed participants’ ethnic background. The majority of participants 
(79%) self-identified as White/Caucasian, 8% as African American, 7% as Hispanic, 5% as 
Asian/Pacific Islander and 1% as Native American/Alaskan.  
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Materials and Pretests.  
Development of the chatroom paradigm. Ostracism was introduced by presenting 
participants with the logfile of an online chat, see Appendix A. In this chat, three discussants talk 
about a group presentation that they have to prepare as part of an experiment. One of the 
discussants (the target) is ignored by the other two (the sources) who pay little attention to the 
target’s suggestions. The names of the discussants are randomized. To allow for variation due to 
the similarity manipulation, the content of the chat conversation is rather ambiguous, that is, it 
remains unclear whether the target is excluded for her behavior or for other reasons. The chat 
was pretested and adapted in a series of pre-studies on both Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as well 
as in the lab. This was done for two reasons: a) to ensure that participants both clearly understand 
that one of the discussants is being excluded and b) to ensure that the chat was sufficiently 
ambiguous, so that individuals do not unanimously blame either the target or the sources for the 
exclusion. The data and the results for the pretest of the final version of the chat can be accessed 
via the Open Science Framework2. 
Facial Portraits. In the present study, the similarity between the actors was manipulated 
by means of facial portraits. All discussants were represented by a facial portrait from the MR2 
database (Strohminger et al., 2016). For the essential distinction condition, we selected two 
female Caucasian, two African American, and two Asian faces. For the non-essential distinction 
condition, three Caucasian portraits were manipulated so that the presented persons differed in 
their hairstyles (either a bun or a crown braid), see Appendix B for examples of the 
manipulation. To make sure that the faces would be perceived as equally similar or non-similar, 
we conducted a pretest on Amazon Mechanical Turk with 30 participants (11 female, Mage = 
32.43, SD = 8.61). They were shown a set of three portraits and had to decide which one was the 
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“odd-one-out” as fast as possible. They did this for the four different combinations also used in 
the main study (two Asians and one of the African American faces, two African American and 
one of the Caucasian faces, two Caucasian and one of the Asian faces, as well as two persons 
with a bun and one with a braid hairstyle). The order in which the sets were presented was 
randomized between participants. More than 90% of all participants selected the intended “odd-
one-out”, with the exception of the Caucasian/Asian set (68% correct responses). Since this was 
likely due to one of the Caucasian portraits having lighter hair than the other one, in the main 
study, the hair colors of the Caucasian portraits were matched.  
Procedure. Participants were told that they would read the protocol of an online chat. To 
introduce the discussants, participants in the essential distinction condition saw pictures of three 
women that differed in ethnic background (Caucasian/Asian, African American/Asian, 
Caucasian/African American). Importantly, none of the discussants shared an ethnic background 
with the respective participant; for instance, a Caucasian participant was shown a group that 
consisted of Asian and African American discussants.  
Participants in the non-essential distinction condition were shown pictures of three 
women that differed in their hairstyle. To emphasize the non-essentiality of the discussants’ 
hairstyles, participants were further told that the three discussants got a makeover with a new 
hairstyle before the picture was taken. Next, participants read the online chat discussion and 
afterwards evaluated all three discussants on the dependent variables. To assess interest in 
cooperation, participants were asked: “How much would you like to work together on a similar 
project with the following persons?” (7-point scale, not at all – very much). Anger, sympathy, as 
well as malicious and punitive intent were assessed as in Studies 1 and 2. To assess whether 
participants detected ostracism, they were asked: “Please rate the extent to which each person's 
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       30 
contributions to the group discussion were acknowledged by the other group members” and 
“How much did each person's opinion contribute to the decision making process?” (7-point 
scales, not at all – very much). In addition, participants rated each of the three discussants on two 
7-point semantic differentials “excluded – included”, “ignored – acknowledged”. The 
evaluations for the sources were averaged across the sources separately for each variable (ρ = .75 
- .91). Subsequently, participants answered three control questions, e.g., “Which presentation 
tool did the participants eventually agree on?“ and indicated on two 7-point scales how realistic 
the chat felt (very unrealistic – very realistic) as well as how positive the discussion was 
(extremely negative – extremely positive). 
Results 
Manipulation checks and control questions. Compared to the sources, participants 
reported that the target contributed less to the decision process, p < .001, d = 1.93 (MSources = 
5.94, SD = 0.96; MTarget = 2.24 , SD = 1.35), that her contributions were acknowledged less, p < 
.001, d = 2.23 (MSources = 6.03, SD = 1.00 ; MTarget = 2.06 , SD = 1.22), and that she was more 
excluded, p < .001, d = 2.51 (MSources= 6.63, SD = 0.74; MTarget = 2.17, SD = 1.47) and ignored, p 
< .001, d = 2.67 (MSources= 6.64 , SD = 0.72; MTarget= 2.13 , SD = 1.41). The majority of 
participants answered the control questions correctly (89%) and felt that the chat was realistic (M 
= 5.29, SD = 1.42) and slightly negative (in comparison to the scale midpoint; M = 3.55, SD = 
1.14). 
Dependent variables. A 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. source) x 2 (essentiality distinction: 
essential vs. non-essential) x 2 (discussant: target vs. sources) MANOVA on interest in 
cooperation, anger, and sympathy revealed a significant main effect for the discussant, Wilks’ λ 
= .609, F(3, 185) = 39.62, p < .001, η2 = .39, indicating that, in general, participants were more 
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interested in cooperating with the sources but had more sympathy for the target. Moreover, the 
similarity x discussant interaction was significant, Wilks’ λ = .911, F(3, 185) = 6.02, p = .001, η2 
= .09. There was no significant main effect of similarity, essentiality distinction, or any 
interaction with essentiality distinction, smallest p = .102. 
A series of planned follow-up ANOVAs for each of the dependent variables showed that 
the similarity x discussant interaction was significant for every dependent variable (Interest in 
Cooperation: F(1, 187) = 13.76, p < .001, η2 = .07, Anger: F(1, 187) = 14.47, p < .001, η2 = .07, 
Sympathy: F(1, 187) = 6.37 p = .012, η2 = .03. Simple main effects analyses showed that when 
the target was the odd-one-out, participants were less interested in cooperating with the sources, 
p < .001, d = .63, and reported being more angry with the sources, p = .001, d = .51, than when a 
source was the odd-one-out. Moreover, participants were more interested in cooperating with the 
target, p = .038, d = .31, and felt more sympathetic, p = .013, d = .41, and less angry towards 
her, p = .004, d = .41.  
Within-subject comparisons were conceptually analogous to the between-subjects 
analyses, insofar that when the target was the odd-one-out, the sources were devalued more than 
the target, while when a source was the odd-one-out, the target was devalued more than the 
sources. For the descriptive statistics, see Table 6. 
A 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. source) x 2 (essentiality distinction: essential vs. non-
essential) x 2 (attribution: malicious vs. punitive) ANOVA with attribution as a repeated measure 
showed a significant main effect for odd-one-out, F(1, 187) = 5.58, p = .016, η2 = .03 and 
attribution, F(1, 187) = 9.03, p = .003, η2 = .05, which were both qualified by the hypothesized 
interaction, F(1, 187) = 14.14, p < .001, η2 = .07. Essentiality of the group had no significant 
effects, Fs < 1. Participants attributed ostracism less strongly to a punitive motive, p = .024, d = 
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.35, and more strongly to a malicious motive, p < .001, d = .66, when the target was the odd-one-
out compared to when a source was. Within-condition comparisons showed that when the target 
was the odd-one-out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious motive than 
to a punitive motive, p < .001, d = .52. 
Mediation via attribution. We ran the same two mediation analyses as in Studies 2 and 
3; see Table 7 for the direct path coefficients. When the target was the odd-one-out, compared to 
the source being the odd-one-out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious 
motive, and as a result of this attribution, evaluated the target partly more positively, that is, they 
were more interested in cooperating with the target, βindirect = .10, 90% CI = [.05, .17], were less 
angry, βindirect = -.07, 90% CI = [-.11; -.03], and more sympathetic towards the target, βindirect = 
.18, 90% CI = [.11; .26]. Moreover, participants evaluated the sources more negatively, that is, 
they were less interested in cooperating with the sources, βindirect = -.14, 90% CI = [-.20; .08], 
were more angry, βindirect = .20, 90% CI = [.12; .29], and less sympathetic towards them, βindirect = 
-.13, 90% CI = [-.19; -.07], compared to when the source was the odd-one-out.  
Inversely, when the source was the odd-one-out, compared to the target being the odd-
one-out, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a punitive motive, and as a result of 
this attribution, evaluated the target more negatively, that is, they were less interested in 
cooperating with the target, βindirect = .06, 90% CI = [.02; .12], were more angry, βindirect = -.10, 
90% CI = [-.16; -.03] and less sympathetic towards the target, βindirect = .05, 90% CI = [.01; .09]. 
Moreover, participants were more interested in cooperating with the sources, βindirect = -.06, 90% 
CI = [-.11; -.02], less angry, βindirect = .03, 90% CI = .01; .07], and more sympathetic towards the 
sources, βindirect = -.07, 90% CI = [-.11; -.02], compared to when the source was the odd-one-out.  
Discussion 
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       33 
Study 4 replicated the results of Studies 2 and 3 with a new paradigm: perceived 
dissimilarity affected observers’ attributions and evaluations of observed ostracism within an 
online chat. As in the previous studies, the effect of similarity on evaluations was mediated via 
the attribution of ostracism to a punitive or a malicious motive. In addition to similarity between 
the group members, we further manipulated the essentiality of the group distinction (ethnic 
background vs. hairstyle), but found no effect on observers’ moral judgment. While one would 
expect that exclusion of a person with a different skin color might be interpreted as due to racial 
bias and thus evaluated negatively, exclusion of participants with a different, randomly assigned 
hairstyle was also attributed to a malicious motive and evaluated negatively. One possible 
explanation for this is that the social dissimilarity rule is something fundamental which is applied 
independently of whether differences are essential or not – rather, any hint to dissimilarity is 
taken as evidence. This would indicate a deeply rooted fairness perspective that no one should be 
left out just because she/he is dissimilar from the group. Alternatively, one could assume that 
individuals also have lay theories that a hairstyle might be indicative of culture or other 
fundamental differences. However, since we provided participants with the information that the 
discussants were styled as a part of the experiment and thus did not choose the hairstyles 
themselves, this explanation appears unlikely.  
Study 5 
In Studies 2-4, we showed that similarity affects observers’ moral judgment about a 
social exclusion episode they had little or very ambiguous information about. In Study 5, we 
tested whether ambiguity of the situation is in fact a necessary prerequisite for individuals to use 
the social dissimilarity rule. To do so, we added a beginning to the chat in which the group 
members introduced themselves and it became obvious whether the target had deviated from 
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prevailing social norms before being excluded or not. We assumed that if participants received a 
more meaningful cue, such as history of the situation, then this would trump the social 
dissimilarity rule and thus similarity should not influence participants’ moral judgment any 
more. In addition, to attest to generalizability of the dissimilarity effect, in Study 5 we 
manipulated dissimilarity via the nationality of the group members. 
Method  
Participants and design. Participants were recruited online from Prolific Academic (US 
Americans only) for a payment of £1.20. We initially calculated the sample size such as to detect 
a medium-sized target initial behavior x similarity x evaluated person interaction effect on a 
single dependent variable (f = .25, power = .90, required n = 206). The initial sample consisted of 
238 participants (116 females, Mage = 32.11, SD = 11.16). After running the study, however, it 
became clear that the effect size of the expected three-way interaction was likely smaller than 
expected (range of observed fs = .09 - .16). Upon suggestion during the review process, we opted 
to test whether the three-way interaction shows if statistical power is sufficiently high. We 
therefore re-calculated the sample size using an average of the observed effect sizes (f = .14, 
power = .80, required n = 510), and collected data of 289 additional participants (128 females, 
Mage = 34.68, SD = 12.04) on Prolific Academic. There were no significant differences between 
the two samples on any of the dependent variables, all F < 1. The final sample thus consisted of 
527 participants (244 females, Mage = 33.52, SD = 11.71). Participants were randomly assigned 
to a 3 (targets’ initial behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating vs. unknown) x 2 (odd-one-
out: target vs. no one) factorial design. 
Materials and Pretest. Similarity was manipulated via the countries that the discussants 
came from. To make sure that participants would have no or very few existing associations with 
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regard to similarities between the countries, we conducted a pretest on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
with 20 participants (10 female, Mage = 30.05, SD = 8.82), testing both a set of the three Baltic 
countries Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, as well as a set of the three Scandinavian countries 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland. We asked participants to write down their spontaneous 
associations with each of the countries and then to compare each of the countries with the other 
two in the respective set. The comparison questions were worded as follows: “In your opinion, 
how different from each other are people from X and people from Y?” and “How different do 
you think people from X consider themselves to be from people in Y?”(1 = not different at all; 7 
= extremely different). Descriptive results indicate that participants perceived moderate 
differences between people from both the three Baltic countries (M = 3.57, SD = 1.18) and the 
three Scandinavian countries (M = 3.71, SD = 1.07), and assumed that people from these 
countries would perceive these differences even more strongly (Baltic: M = 4.74, SD = 1.04; 
Scandinavia: M = 4.34, SD = 1.00). Most importantly, there were no significant differences 
between the country ratings in the respective sets, all F < 1.08. Because the answers on the open 
association questions indicated that participants had fewer associations with the Baltic than with 
the Scandinavian countries, we chose the three Baltic countries for the main study. 
In addition to the country of origin, the target’s initial behavior was manipulated by 
presenting participants with different versions of the chat. In the “unknown” condition, 
participants saw the same chat protocol as in Study 4, which started at a seemingly random point 
during the discussion. In the two other conditions, the discussants additionally introduced 
themselves at the beginning of the chat, so that participants would assume they were reading the 
chatroom discussion from the beginning, see Appendix C. In both conditions, the two sources 
expressed that they looked forward to the group task. The target then either wrote a friendly 
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introduction in a similar manner to the sources, thus acting consistent with the social norm of 
friendliness (norm-consistent condition). In particular, the target wrote: “I'm [name], pleased to 
meet and work together with both of you too!“ In the condition supposed to violate the social 
norm of friendliness (norm-violating condition), the target started with a rude sentence, writing: 
“Can we skip the introductions and just get started? I’ve always hated working in groups.“ After 
that, the chat continued the same in all three conditions. In a pretest on Prolific Academic with 
42 participants (13 female, Mage = 32.50, SD = 9.39), participants saw either the norm-consistent 
or the norm-violating version of the introduction chat sequence, and were asked about the three 
discussants’ behavior on three 7-point semantic differentials: improper – proper, rude – friendly, 
inappropriate – appropriate (all α > .97). Results showed a significant person x condition 
interaction, F(2, 38) = 36.87, p < .001, η2 = .66. The target’s behavior was perceived as more 
appropriate in the norm-consistent condition than in the norm-violating condition, F(1,39) = 
81.30, p < .001, η2 = .68 (M = 6.67, SD = .83 vs. M = 2.68, SD = 1.82). In the norm-consistent 
condition, there were no significant differences between the three discussants, F < 1. However, 
in the norm-violating condition the behavior of the target was seen as less appropriate than the 
behavior of both sources, F(2, 38) = 79.72, p < .001, η2 = .81.  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 4. Participants read the chat that either 
started without an introduction, or with the norm-consistent, or the norm-violating introduction. 
During the chat, the respective countries of origin were represented by little flags that were 
presented next to the names of the three discussants. In the odd-one-out condition, the two 
sources were from one country and the target from another (e.g., the sources were from Latvia 
and the target from Estonia). In the condition where no one was the odd-one-out, all discussants 
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       37 
came from the same country. The discussants’ names were determined randomly between the 
three discussants. 
Results 
Manipulation checks and control questions. Participants reported that the target 
contributed less to the decision process than the sources, p < .001, d = 1.94 (ρSources =.76, MSources 
= 5.97, SD = .98; MTarget = 2.31, SD = 1.49), the target’s contributions were acknowledged less, 
p < .001, d = 2.09 (ρSources = .80, MSources = 6.02, SD = .94; MTarget = 2.20, SD = 1.34), and that 
the target was more excluded, p < .001, d = 2.40 (ρSources = .75, MSources= 6.56, SD = 0.73; MTarget 
= 2.32, SD = 1.56), and ignored, p < .001, d = 2.34 (ρSources = .76, MSources= 6.54, SD = 0.79; 
MTarget= 2.37, SD = 1.55). The majority of participants answered all control questions correctly 
(92%) and felt that the chat was realistic (M = 5.07, SD = 1.52), but slightly negative (M = 3.65, 
SD = 1.31). On average, participants reported little knowledge about the three Baltic countries, α 
= .93, M = 1.84, SD = 121. 
Dependent variables.  
Evaluation. A 3 (targets’ initial behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating vs. 
unknown) x 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. no one) x 2 (discussant: target vs. sources) MANOVA on 
interest in cooperation, anger, and sympathy revealed a significant main effect for the discussant, 
Wilks’ λ = .587, F(3, 519) = 68.45, p < .001, η2 = .41. This main effect was qualified by two 
two-way interactions: odd-one-out x discussant, Wilks’ λ = .961, F(3, 519) = 7.07, p < .001, η2 = 
.04, and targets’ behavior x discussant, Wilks’ λ = .802, F(6, 1038) = 19.24, p < .001, η2 = .10. 
The three-way interaction was not significant, with F(6, 1038) = 1.81, p = .094, η2 = .01, despite 
the increase in sample size. Looking at the three variables separately, the three-way interaction 
for anger was F(2, 521) = 3.01, p = .050, η2 = .01, but was not significant for interest in 
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cooperation and sympathy, both F < 1, η2 = .00. Given this finding, which we will discuss further 
below, we restrict interpretations to the significant two-way interactions.  
Specifically, a series of planned follow-up ANOVAs for each of the dependent variables 
showed that (a) the two-way interaction odd-one-out x discussant was significant for every 
dependent variable (Interest in Cooperation: F(1, 521) = 13.60, p < .001, η2 = .03, Anger: F(1, 
521) = 4.09, p = .027, η2 = .01, Sympathy: F(1, 521) = 14.13, p < .001, η2 = .03) and (b) the two-
way interaction target’s behavior x discussant effect was significant for every dependent variable 
(Interest in Cooperation: F(2, 521) = 52.64, p < .001, η2 = .17; Anger: F(2, 521) = 56.47, p < 
.001, η2 = .18, Sympathy: F = 37.76, p < .001, η2 = .13). We further analyze the two two-way 
interactions separately in what follows. For the descriptive statistics, see Table 8 and Figure 2. 
Odd-one-out x discussant. Simple main effects analyses again demonstrated support for 
the social dissimilarity rule: When the target was the odd-one-out, participants were overall less 
interested in cooperating with the sources, p =.009, d = .23, more angry at the sources, p = .013, 
d = .22 and reported less sympathy for the sources, p = .001, d = .28, compared to when there 
was no odd-one-out. Moreover, participants were overall more interested in cooperating with the 
target, p = .001, d = .28, and also reported more sympathy with the target, p = .002, d = .27, 
compared to when there was no odd-one-out. Within-subject comparisons were conceptually 
analogous to the between-subjects analyses, insofar that when the target was the odd-one-out, the 
sources were devalued more than the target, and when the target was not the odd-one-out, the 
target was devalued more than the sources (see Table 8). However, in both conditions, 
participants were overall less interested in working together with the target compared to the 
sources, both p < .001, smallest d = .21.  
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Target’s behavior x discussant. In the norm-violating condition, participants were more 
interested in cooperating with the sources, both p < .001, smallest d = .61 and less angry, both p 
< .001, smallest d = .60, and more sympathetic towards the sources, both p < .001, smallest d = 
.67, compared to the other two conditions. Moreover, participants were less interested in 
cooperating with the target, both p < .001, d = .90, and were more angry, both p < .001, smallest 
d = .82, and less sympathetic towards him/her, both p < .001, smallest d = .60, compared to the 
other two conditions.  
Within-subject comparisons were conceptually analogous to the between-subjects 
analyses, insofar that when the target behaved norm-consistently or the target’s behavior was 
unknown, participants devalued the sources more than the target (see Table 8). In contrast, when 
the target showed norm-violating behavior at the beginning of the chat, then participants 
devalued the target more than the sources. 
Attribution. A 3 (targets’ initial behavior: norm-consistent vs. norm-violating vs. 
unknown) x 2 (odd-one-out: target vs. no one) x 2 (attribution: malicious vs. punitive) ANOVA 
with attribution as a repeated measure showed a significant main effect of attribution, F(1, 521) 
= 14.05, p < .001, η2 = .03 and the target’s initial behavior, F(2, 521) = 4.34, p = .014, η2 = .02, 
an interaction of the target’s initial behavior x attribution, F(2, 521) = 71.71, p < .001, η2 = .22, 
an interaction odd-one-out x attribution, F(1, 521) = 14.17, p < .001, η2 = .03, an interaction 
target’s initial behavior x odd-one-out, F(2, 521) = 4.04, p = .017, η2 = .02, as well as a three-
way interaction target’s initial behavior x odd-one-out x attribution, F(2, 521) = 3.53, p = .030, 
η2 = .01. To deconstruct the interactions, we ran follow-up ANOVAs separately for the condition 
in which the target’s behavior was norm-consistent, norm-violating, and unknown. When the 
target showed norm-violating behavior at the beginning of the chat, participants attributed 
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ostracism more strongly to a punitive motive than to a malicious one, F(1, 174) = 60.69, p < 
.001, η2 = .26 (Mpunitive = 4.12, SD = 1.52 vs. Mmalicious = 2.69, SD = 1.27). In contrast, when the 
target showed norm-consistent behavior at the beginning of the chat, participants attributed 
ostracism more strongly to a malicious motive than to a punitive one, F(1, 173) = 43.54, p < 
.001, η2 = .20 (Mmalicious = 3.83, SD = 1.59 vs. Mpunitive = 2.53, SD = 1.32). The odd-one-out did 
not affect individuals’ attribution in both conditions, smallest p = .061. However, when the 
target’s previous behavior was unknown, the effect of the attribution, F(1, 174) = 54.34, p < 
.001, η2 = .24, was qualified by the significant odd-one-out x attribution interaction, F(1, 174) = 
17.97, p < .001, η2 = .09. Participants attributed ostracism more strongly to a malicious motive 
when the target was the odd-one-out (M = 4.50, SD = 1.61) compared to when no one was (M = 
3.44, SD = 1.42), p < .001, d = .70. In contrast, participants attributed ostracism more strongly to 
a punitive motive when there was no odd-one-out (M = 2.87, SD = 1.29) compared to when the 
target was the odd-one-out (M = 2.38, SD = 1.38), p = .015, d = .37. Within-condition 
comparisons showed that in both conditions, a malicious motive was more strongly assumed than 
a punitive motive, p < .001, d = .82 and p = .026, d = .25. 
Discussion 
In Study 5, we provided participants with information about the history of the exclusion 
situation to investigate whether the availability of more diagnostic information would diminish 
the use of the social dissimilarity rule. To this end, two thirds of the participants were 
additionally provided with a protocol of the chats’ opening exchanges, during which the target 
acted either consistently with the social norm of being friendly, or violated this norm by acting 
rudely. In contrast, one third of participants was not provided with further information about the 
chat’s beginning sequence (unknown history; same as in Study 4). We observed a strong effect 
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of knowledge: if the target initially displayed rude behavior (which is inconsistent with the social 
norm of being friendly), participants attributed ostracism to a punitive motive and sided with the 
sources. Moreover, in line with our general hypothesis and replicating the previous studies, we 
observed an effect of the social dissimilarity rule. Contrary to our specific hypothesis in Study 5, 
however, the three-way interaction did not show, despite sufficient statistical power, suggesting 
that the effect of the social dissimilarity rule is not moderated by knowledge about the situation.  
Ex post we believe that this pattern makes sense. Under the assumption that observers 
may use simultaneously both knowledge about the situation and the social dissimilarity rule, it is 
conceivable that information pieces do not interact or qualify each other, but are taken as 
independent input. In terms of effect sizes, the effect of the target’s previous behavior was 
considerably larger than the effect of the social dissimilarity rule. Thus, it seems that in our chat 
observer rely on knowledge about the situation’s history to a stronger extent than on social 
dissimilarity information. Potentially, the difference in effect sizes between situational 
information and social dissimilarity may be a function of the paradigm chosen and is perhaps 
different when contextual information is even more salient or diagnostic.  
Although knowledge about the target’s previous behavior did not moderate the effect of 
the social dissimilarity rule on evaluation, it did so with respect to attributions. In particular, with 
respect to attributions, social dissimilarity did not affect attributions when participants had 
information about the target’s previous behavior (norm-consistent as well as norm-violating). 
That the pattern of attributions and evaluations dissociates with respect to the three-way 
interaction may reflect that attributions are influenced by the available information more directly 
than evaluations. Again, it is conceivable that this situation changes for paradigms in which 
contextual information is even more salient or diagnostic.  
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Methodological Considerations and Empirical Summary 
Internal Validity 
Manipulation of the independent variables were either pretested and/or tested via 
manipulation checks in all studies. All continuous manipulation checks were significant. When 
we used categorical manipulation checks, tests of hypotheses were run with and without the 
participants who incorrectly answered a manipulation check, which changed neither the 
significance levels nor the observed patterns. We tested our hypotheses using two different 
paradigms (scenario and chat paradigm); moreover, in Study 1, we asked people to recall their 
own observed ostracism experiences to build our studies on peoples’ real-life considerations 
regarding observed ostracism episodes. 
Sample Sizes and Diversity 
The required sample size was calculated for all studies using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), opting for a power of at least .80 or higher. Except for Study 3 (the 
laboratory study), the required n was obtained for all studies. We assessed participants’ gender 
and age in all studies. In the online studies, the gender distribution turned out to be balanced, and 
the majority of participants were aged between 20 and 40 years. This is in line with samples that 
can be expected from MTurk and Prolific Academic, which have been found to be more diverse 
than standard Internet or student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Peer, 
Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). While Study 3, the laboratory study, features a much 
more specific sample (mostly female, Swiss psychology students in their early twenties), we find 
the same basic effect than in the more diverse, US online samples. Thus, we would expect the 
effect to generalize across samples, at least within Western cultures. 
Mini-Meta Analyses 
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To gauge the findings’ robustness, we conducted two separate meta-analyses on Studies 
2-5, testing the effect of the odd-one-out (a) on the evaluation of the target and (b) on the 
evaluation of the sources. We averaged the effect sizes for the dependent variables assessing 
evaluation (blame, interest in cooperation, anger, sympathy) to compute one average effect size 
per study for both the target and the sources. Following the approach suggested by Goh, Hall, 
and Rosenthal (2016), we used fixed effects in which the mean effect size was weighted by 
sample size. As for (a), the evaluation of the target, the effect of the odd-one-out was significant, 
M r = .16, Z = 5.46, p < .001, two-tailed, such that ostracizing an odd-one-out resulted in 
observers evaluating the ostracized target more positively. As for (b), the evaluation of the 
sources, the effect was significant, M r = .18, Z = 5.95, p < .001, two-tailed, such that 
ostracizing an odd-one-out resulted in observers evaluating the ostracizing sources more 
negatively. A fully random effects test of the overall effect was also significant for both the 
evaluation of the target, M r = .21, t(3)= 4.91, p = .016, and the evaluation of the sources, M r = 
.23, t(3)= 5.93, p = .010. 
General Discussion 
Observers of ostracism episodes face a critical, yet difficult task to regulate their own 
behavior: They may wish to decide whether exclusion of the target by the group is justified or 
not. In the present research, we demonstrate in five studies that ostracism that is attributed to a 
malicious motive of the sources (such as ingroup favoritism) is perceived as unjustified. In 
contrast, ostracism that is attributed to a punitive motive appears more justified to observers. We 
further suggest and empirically substantiate that in ambiguous situations with little information, 
observers make use of situational cues to decide whether to attribute ostracism to a malicious or 
a punitive motive. One situational cue that individuals may draw on is social dissimilarity, that 
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is, the extent to which an ostracized target is similar to the ostracizing sources. This dissimilarity 
may be a function of values or attitudes; but crucially, it may also be a function of much more 
easily observable cues that are quickly processed, such as team labels or hairstyles. Four studies 
provide empirical evidence that when two similar sources exclude a dissimilar target (i.e., the 
odd-one-out), individuals assume a malicious motive of the sources and report more anger and 
less interest in cooperation with the sources as well as more sympathy for the target, compared to 
other group constellations. In contrast, if the target is similar to the sources, individuals more 
likely assume a punitive motive, which results in less sympathy and interest to cooperate with the 
target as well as more anger. This general pattern of findings is robust across two different 
paradigms: a scenario in Studies 2 and 3, and the observation of a group chat in Studies 4 and 5. 
We further demonstrate that the effect of the social dissimilarity rule is neither reduced by a 
cognitive capacity manipulation (Study 3), nor by perceived essentialism of the group distinction 
(Study 4), which stresses our notion that the social dissimilarity rule is general, frugal, and 
processed with ease. While dissimilarity resulting from easily observable cues allows for quick 
processing, these cues may not constitute very valid information. As a result, we predicted that 
the social dissimilarity rule (based on easily observable cues) is relied on primarily in ambiguous 
situations, that is, when more diagnostic information is lacking. Consistent with this reasoning, 
participants in Study 5 primarily based their judgement on more diagnostic information if such 
information became available, such as whether the target had previously violated a social norm 
by acting rudely. Nevertheless, social dissimilarity still continued to affect observer’s moral 
judgment even in situations that provide a richer background.  
Observers’ Attributions of Ostracism 
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The present research adds to a body of literature which emphasizes the importance of 
individuals’ interpretations and attributions of ostracism situations (Arpin, et al., 2017; Rudert & 
Greifeneder, 2016; Rudert, Reutner, et al., 2017; Tuscherer et al., 2015; Wesselmann, et al., 
2014; Wesselmann, Wirth, et al., 2013). Earlier studies more or less explicitly implied that 
observers of ostracism unconditionally tend to empathize with the targets and “feel their pain” 
(Legate, DeHaan, Weinstein, & Ryan, 2013; Masten, et al., 2011; Wesselmann, et al., 2009; 
Will, et al., 2013). However, the present research indicates that observers instead consider 
whether ostracism represents a norm violation or a rightful punishment and make a moral 
judgment based on the available cues of the situation. One reason why earlier research primarily 
observed empathizing with the target may be the methodology employed: In the majority of 
previous observer studies, participants observed or participated in a stand-alone Cyberball game 
with players that lack a common history. In this situation, individuals have no reason to assume 
that the target has committed a norm violation that the other players are aware of. In contrast, in 
the paradigms used in the present research, observers knew that there was some previous 
common history, and that there was the possibility that the target had deviated from the norm 
before by being uncooperative and/or rude.  
By stipulating that observers do not unconditionally side with the target, the present 
research also highlights the important role of motives (here: punitive and malicious), that has 
been discussed in the beginning of ostracism research (Sommer, Williams, Ciarocco, & 
Baumeister, 2001; Williams, 2002). However, research on motives of the sources has not 
received much attention in recent years, possibly because motives seemed to be of minor 
importance for the targets’ reactions and well-being and ostracism even hurts when it is 
unintentional (Williams, 2009; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Yet, as the present 
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research demonstrates, from the observers’ perspectives, it is crucial to take into account which 
attributions observers make regarding the sources’ motives, especially whether observers assume 
an underlying punitive or a more selfish, malicious motive of the ostracizing sources.  
Development of moral attributions for ostracism 
The present findings provide evidence that observers dislike sources who ostracize the 
“odd-one-out,” because they attribute ostracism to a malicious motive such as ingroup favoritism 
and discrimination. However, the picture changes when the target has violated social norms: 
such punitive ostracism is perceived as justified and acceptable. One question one may 
reasonably ask is from where these consistently observed attributions result. On a speculative 
note, we assume that they are learned during an individual’s ontogenesis, and are deeply 
ingrained in cultural knowledge that is socially transmitted from the earliest days on. For 
instance, an important lesson taught to children in kindergarten and primary school is that it is 
wrong to ostracize others just because they are different. Consider famous children’s books such 
as Hans Christian Andersen’s story of the Ugly Duckling or Johnny Mark’s popular song about 
Rudolph, the red-nosed reindeer, who is not allowed to “join in any reindeer games” because of 
his brightly shining nose. Reversely, at least in the culture the authors were brought up, children 
in kindergarten and school are often told to “just ignore” a bully instead of physically aggressing. 
In doing so, they learn that ostracism is not only socially acceptable, but an appropriate way to 
deal with troublesome or deviant others. Consistent with this perspective, punitive or defensive 
ostracism are often perceived to be socially acceptable alternatives to direct or physical 
aggression (Robinson, O’Reilly, & Wang, 2013). 
Prevalence of the Social Dissimilarity Rule 
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We observed a robust effect of the social dissimilarity rule in situations that lack 
diagnostic information. How prevalent are situations such as these? We think they are plenty. 
Consider all kinds of transition phases, such as when an individual enters university or starts a 
new job, or when individuals move to another town or neighborhood. Moreover, consider all 
kinds of public events, such as when individuals go to the movies or for a walk through the city. 
In these situations, observers likely lack diagnostic information of prior social context. However, 
making a moral judgment about ostracism might still be of utmost relevance: While an incomer 
may not wish to familiarize with a group of co-workers who ostracize based on race, she might 
also be glad to stay away from the self-absorbed, rude colleague who is ostracized by everyone 
else. To the extent that many situations are characterized by incomplete prior knowledge, we 
thus speculate that the social dissimilarity rule is relied on quite frequently.  
Alternative Explanation: Differences in Perceived Hurt  
We have argued that the evaluation of targets and observers is mainly driven by 
observers’ moral judgment of the ostracism episode and the attributions on the sources’ 
underlying motives. This relation was also emphasized by the analyses indicating that the effect 
of dissimilarity on evaluation was mediated via attributions to different motives. In addition, one 
could speculate about whether the observed effect could also be driven by the observers’ 
assessment of how aversive and hurtful ostracism may be for the ostracized target. In other 
words, observers might experience more empathy if they assume that ostracism felt more hurtful 
for the target. Such differences in felt hurt could presumably arise as a function of group 
membership. However, given that observers would presumably assume that ostracism by the 
ingroup hurts the target more than ostracism by the outgroup, according to this explanation we 
should have found the exact opposite effect of the observed evidence, namely a more positive 
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evaluation of the target when she/he is ostracized by her/his ingroup (similarity) compared to 
her/his outgroup (dissimilarity). The differences-in-hurt alternative explanation is also rather 
difficult to reconcile with the observed evidence on mediation via motive attribution.  
As a potential caveat, it should be mentioned that all mediation analyses were performed 
on cross-sectional data. Conclusions about causality can be therefore be tentative only. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that we specified the mediation models against the background 
of the a priori theoretical assumption that attributions precede evaluations. Although it is possible 
to imagine contexts in which the reversed causal relation is true as well (i.e., evaluations 
affecting attributions), such a relation appears less plausible from a theoretical standpoint, 
especially if participants have no previous information or opinion about the persons they are 
about to evaluate, as it was the case in our experiments. Note that the present assumption about a 
causal link from attributions to evaluations is consistent with other research (e.g., Arpin, et al., 
2017; Chatman & Von Hippel, 2001).  
Consequences of Moral Judgments 
So far, we have tacitly assumed that observers’ moral judgments matter. We wish to close 
with a short speculation on the downstream consequences of observers’ moral judgments to 
bolster this assumption. First, to the extent that observers’ judgments are known to the group 
members, observers’ judgments will likely matter for the targets’ feelings and behavior (as the 
observer may be perceived as an ally or not), as well as for the sources’ feelings and behavior (as 
they may perceive approval or disapproval). As such, the mere judgments may prove quite 
consequential. For instance, a child that is ostracized by some of his peers may take comfort in 
knowing if either other peers, or her teachers, signal that they do not approve of how the child is 
treated. Second, as a further downstream consequence, observers’ moral judgments may impact 
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the observers’ behavior, such as bystander intervention. Bystander intervention is likely 
influenced by many variables and considerations other than moral judgment, such as whether the 
observer deems that it is appropriate or necessary to intervene  (Chekroun & Brauer, 2002; 
Fischer et al., 2011; Latané & Darley, 1969). Nevertheless, moral judgments are one predictor of 
helping behavior and may therefore play a critical role.  
We have demonstrated that when making moral judgements about ostracism episodes, 
observers may rely on the social dissimilarity rule. These judgments may prove right or wrong 
depending on the cue validity between social dissimilarity and exclusion cause. We have no data 
with respect to cue validity. Nevertheless, it appears commendable to briefly discuss how the cue 
may be wrong, and ways to reduce the rule’s impact in applied settings.  For instance, if sources 
exclude a target due to a dissimilarity that is not easily observable, observers might fail to protect 
an innocent target because they do not detect that the target is the odd-one-out, and thus assume 
that the target must have done something wrong. Alternatively, the target might be dissimilar 
from the sources by coincidence, although the dissimilarity is not the underlying reason for why 
the target is ostracized. In this case, observers may misattribute ostracism to a malicious motive 
and side with a target who has actually hurt the group and instead blame the group that had only 
tried to protect itself from a harmful member.   
A potential solution might be to provide or encourage individuals to seek more 
information before making a moral judgment, consistent with the findings of Study 5. Against 
this background, individuals who have to deal with matters of ostracism and exclusion in 
professional contexts, such as teachers, counselors, conflict mediators, and HR employees, 
should ideally be trained in carefully questioning the entire story behind an ostracism episode, in 
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order to reduce the possibility that their judgment becomes distorted by stereotypes about 
ostracism situations and ostracizers.  
Conclusion 
Taken together, the presented five studies show that observers’ moral judgment of 
ambiguous ostracism situations is influenced by the dissimilarity between the observed group 
members. Especially when a dissimilar person is ostracized by a homogeneous group, observers 
tend to attribute ostracism to a malicious motive and blame as well as devalue the ostracizing 
sources for the situation. In contrast, if the target is not apparently dissimilar from the rest of the 
group, observers are more likely to attribute ostracism to a punitive motive and blame and 
devalue the target instead. The social dissimilarity rule proved robust across several paradigms 
and situational variations. Together, the studies provide valuable insight into how observers 
make moral judgments about ostracism.  
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 Footnotes 
1 In this study as well as all subsequent studies, excluding participants from the analyses 
who failed to answer one or more control questions changed neither the pattern of results nor the 
significance levels within the MANOVA. Thus, all analyses throughout the manuscript are based 
on the full number of participants. 
2  https://osf.io/6g9vk/?view_only=4f52a2d1f5e149b5a220633a3042f9a4 
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Table 1 
Results for Study 1 b 
 
Dependent Variable Situation 1 
(Norm-violating 
Target) 
Situation 2  
(Norm-violating 
Target) 
Situation 3: 
(Dissimilar Target) 
Situation 4: 
(Dissimilar Target) 
Ostracism Justified 4.80 (1.50) 4.28 (1.49) 1.30 (1.04) 1.58 (.99) 
Anger (at Target) 3.18 (1.95) 2.92 (1.74) 2.22 (2.19) 1.98 (1.78) 
Sympathy (for Target) 3.64 (1.94) 4.04 (1.64) 6.36 (.92) 6.22 (1.06) 
Anger (Situation) 3.00 (1.80) 3.04 (1.76) 5.62 (1.63) 4.82 (1.76) 
Sadness (Situation)  3.50 (1.95) 3.86 (1.83) 6.04 (1.23) 5.84 (1.27) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions (situations).  
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Table 2 
Results for Study 2 
 
Dependent Variable Repeated Measure Target as 
 odd-one-out 
Source as  
odd-one-out 
No odd-one-out 
Blame 
Target 3.48 a (2.17) 4.94 b (2.47) 5.00 b (2.20) 
Sources 4.80 c (1.76) 3.58 d (2.00) 3.49 d (1.92) 
Interest in Cooperation 
Target 4.50 a (2.00) 3.29 b (2.13) 3.08 b (1.99) 
Sources 3.57 c (1.83) 4.34 c (1.63) 4.28 c (1.69) 
Anger  
Target 2.15 a (1.76) 2.67 a (2.00) 2.92 a (1.94) 
Sources 3.32 b (1.83) 2.43 a (1.72) 2.51 ab (1.70) 
Sympathy 
Target 4.60 a (1.89) 3.56 b (2.03) 3.35 b (1.84) 
Sources 2.81 c (1.90)  3.49 bc (1.66) 3.77 b (2.01) 
Motive Strength  
Punitive 3.17 a (1.51) 4.35 b (1.48) 4.48 b (1.56) 
Malicious 4.48 c (1.60) 2.87 d (1.50) 2.48 d (1.20) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the three experimental conditions, separately for targets and 
sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent significant differences between groups; all values in the same 
column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with different letters do. 
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Table 3 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Mediation Model in Study 2 
 
 
β 90% CI 
Condition → Punitive Attribution 
Condition → Malicious Attribution 
-.37 
.51 
-.49; -.24 
.40; .61 
Condition → Blame Target 
Condition → Cooperation with Target 
Condition → Anger at Target 
Condition → Sympathy with Target 
.03 
-.11 
.18 
-.10 
-.09; .16 
-.21; -.00 
.08; .27 
-.21; .02 
Condition → Blame Sources 
Condition → Cooperation with Sources 
Condition → Anger at Sources 
Condition → Sympathy with Sources 
-.03 
.11 
-.14 
.11 
-.16; .09 
-.02; .24 
-.26; -.01 
.00; .22 
Punitive Attribution → Blame Target 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Target 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
.39 
-.33 
.65 
-.32 
.25; .54 
-.47; -.21 
.53; .77 
-.49; -.18 
Punitive Attribution → Blame Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
-.09 
.37 
-.08 
.55 
-.24; .06 
.23; .51 
-.24; .07 
.40; .68 
Malicious Attribution → Blame Target 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Target 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
-.37 
.55 
-.19 
.50 
-.54; -.19 
.40; .68 
-.31; -.06 
.32; .65 
Malicious Attribution → Blame Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
.60 
-.35 
.66 
-.23 
.45; .74 
-.50; -.19 
.48; .82 
-.37; -.09 
 
Note. The non-directional path between malicious and punitive attribution was r = -.61, 90% CI = [-.71; -51]. 
Correlations between the dependent variables are not displayed.  
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Table 4 
Results for Study 3 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Low Load High Load 
  Target as odd-
one-out 
Source as odd-
one-out 
Target as odd-
one-out 
Source as odd-
one-out 
Blame 
Target 4.19 a  (2.26) 4.75 ab (2.17) 2.92 c (2.00) 4.60 a (2.55) 
Sources 4.67 ad (1.67) 3.63 bc (1.76) 5.22 d (1.44) 3.92 ac (1.70) 
Interest in 
Cooperation 
Target 5.27 a  (1.59) 4.21 bc (2.15) 6.08 a (.95) 4.40 c (2.16) 
Sources 3.42 c (1.63) 4.65 b (1.46) 3.42 c (1.61) 4.16 bc (1.25) 
Anger  
Target 1.77 a (1.37) 2.37 a (1.50) 1.68 a (1.28) 2.12 a (1.64) 
Sources 3.60 b (1.75) 2.94 ab (1.61) 4.08 b (1.99) 3.34 b (1.66) 
Sympathy 
Target 5.31 a (1.35) 4.21 c (1.82) 5.52 a (1.26) 4.60 c (1.94) 
Sources 2.94 b (1.37) 4.02 cd (1.20) 2.88 b (1.16) 3.64 d (1.29) 
Motive Strength  
Punitive 2.76 a (1.36) 4.21 b (1.27) 2.41 a (.87) 4.04 b (1.61) 
Malicious 5.18 b (1.33) 2.74 a (1.23) 5.16 b (1.10) 3.01 a (1.38) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions, separately for targets and 
sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent bonferroni-corrected significant differences between groups; all 
values in the same column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with 
different letters do.  
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Table 5 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Mediation Model in Study 3 
 
 
β 90% CI 
Condition → Punitive Attribution 
Condition → Malicious Attribution 
-.51 
.68 
-.64; -.37 
.59; .76 
Condition → Blame Target 
Condition → Cooperation with Target 
Condition → Anger at Target 
Condition → Sympathy with Target 
-.04 
-.11 
.13 
-.13 
-.26; .20 
-.28; .07 
-.05; .30 
-.32; .07 
Condition → Blame Sources 
Condition → Cooperation with Sources 
Condition → Anger at Sources 
Condition → Sympathy with Sources 
.04 
-.05 
-.20 
.02 
-.16; .25 
-.23; .14 
-.41; .01 
-.17; .24 
Punitive Attribution → Blame Target 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Target 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
.27 
-.57 
.52 
-.44 
.04; .46 
-.70; -.42 
.35; .68 
-.59; -.28 
Punitive Attribution → Blame Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
-.21 
.16 
.09 
.22 
-.41; .03 
.05; .35 
-.08; .26 
.03; .40 
Malicious Attribution → Blame Target 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Target 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
-.09 
.26 
-.06 
.30 
-.35; .13 
.05; .45 
-.30; .18 
.07; 50 
Malicious Attribution → Blame Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
.27 
-.27 
.65 
-.38 
.07; .50 
-.47; -.08 
.43; .86 
-.64; -.13 
 
Note. The non-directional path between malicious and punitive attribution was r = -.50, 90% CI = [-.63; -36]. 
Correlations between the dependent variables are not displayed.  
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Table 6 
Results for Study 4. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Non-essential Group Essential Group 
  Target as odd-
one-out 
Source as odd-
one-out 
Target as odd-
one-out 
Source as odd-
one-out 
Interest in 
Cooperation 
Target 3.47 a  (1.75) 3.00 a (1.82) 3.53 a (2.00) 2.87 a (1.75) 
Sources 3.50 a (1.98) 4.58 b (1.74) 3.48 a (1.80) 4.69 b (1.82) 
Anger  
Target 3.15 a (1.93) 3.86 ac (1.97) 2.87 a (1.59) 3.76 c (1.86) 
Sources 4.04 b (1.71) 3.23 a (1.74) 4.15 b (2.13) 3.05 ac (2.03) 
Sympathy 
Target 4.76 a (1.83) 4.00 b (2.09) 4.40 a (1.98) 3.67 ab (2.04) 
Sources 3.25 b (1.59) 3.78 b (1.91) 3.28 ab (1.73) 3.76 ab (1.90) 
Motive Strength  
Punitive 2.63 a (1.45) 3.15 a (1.41) 2.71 a (1.47) 3.20 a (1.59) 
Malicious 4.05 b (1.53) 3.24 a (1.53) 4.00 b (1.67) 2.81 a (1.46) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the four experimental conditions, separately for targets and 
sources of ostracism. The letters a - d represent bonferroni-corrected significant differences between groups; all 
values in the same column or row that share the same letter do not differ significantly from each other, values with 
different letters do. 
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Table 7 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Mediation Model in Study 4 
 
 
β 90% CI 
Condition → Punitive Attribution 
Condition → Malicious Attribution 
-.17 
.32 
-.29; -.06 
.21; .42 
Condition → Cooperation with Target 
Condition → Anger at Target 
Condition → Sympathy with Target 
-.01 
-.04 
-.03 
-.11; .08 
-.12; .05 
-.11; .04 
Condition → Cooperation with Sources 
Condition → Anger at Sources 
Condition → Sympathy with Sources 
-.10 
.01 
.05 
-.18; -.01 
-.07; .09 
-.04; .14 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Target 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
-.37 
.56 
-.28 
-.50; -.23 
.46; .65 
-.38; -.17 
Punitive Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Punitive Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
.35 
-.19 
.38 
.24; .46 
-.30; -.08 
.26; .49 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Target 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Target 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Target 
.33 
-.21 
.57 
.18; .48 
-.33; -.10 
.48; .68 
Malicious Attribution → Cooperation with Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Anger at Sources 
Malicious Attribution → Sympathy with Sources 
-.44 
.63 
-.40 
-.55; -.33 
.53; .73 
-.51; -.29 
 
Note. The non-directional path between malicious and punitive attribution was r = -.58, 90% CI = [-.66; -50]. 
Correlations between the dependent variables are not displayed.  
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Table 8 
Results for Study 5. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Repeated 
Measure 
Norm-violating  
Target 
Norm-consistent  
Target 
Unknown 
Target Behavior  
  Target as  
odd-one-out 
No odd- 
one-out 
Target as  
odd-one-out 
No odd- 
one-out 
Target as  
odd-one-out 
No odd- 
one-out 
Interest in 
Cooperation 
Target 2.35 a (1.61) 1.93 a  (1.25) 3.83 b (1.80) 3.30 c (1.60) 3.81 b (1.64) 3.33 bc (1.77) 
Sources 4.94 e (1.73) 5.03 e (1.68) 3.65 b (1.94) 4.20 d (1.61) 3.42 b (1.81) 4.01 d (1.78) 
Anger  
Target 4.88 a (1.46) 4.60 a (1.79) 3.31 cb (1.66) 3.45 c (1.71) 2.95 b (1.64) 3.44 c (1.63) 
Sources 2.69 b (1.70) 2.65 b (1.78) 3.99 a (1.83) 3.49 ac (1.88) 4.15 a (1.79) 3.52 c (1.74) 
Sympathy 
Target 3.76 a (1.67) 3.33 a (1.86) 4.84 bd (1.85) 4.41 b (1.84) 5.01 d (1.59) 4.48 b (1.72) 
Sources 4.53 b (1.61) 4.70 b (1.74) 3.22 c (1.59) 3.77 ae (1.61) 3.20 c (1.66) 3.83 e (1.50) 
Motive  
Strength  
Punitive 4.01 a (1.44) 4.22 a (1.58) 2.43 c (1.33) 2.63 cd (1.30) 2.38 c (1.38) 2.87 d (1.29) 
Malicious 2.66 c (1.20) 2.71 c (1.34) 4.09 a (1.77) 3.55 b (1.33) 4.50 a (1.61) 3.44 b (1.42) 
Note. Means (and standard deviations) as a function of the six experimental conditions, separately for targets and 
sources of ostracism. The values in brackets are the standard deviations. The letters a - d represent bonferroni-
corrected significant differences between groups; all values in the same column or row that share the same letter do 
not differ significantly from each other, values with different letters do. 
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Appendix A  
Chat Room Paradigm (Studies 4 and 5) 
In this study we investigate how people form first impressions of other people in the absence of 
social interaction.  
 
In the following activity, we will show you the history from a recent online chat, which we took 
from another experiment with university students. The chat history contains text from a 
conversation among three students who are preparing a short group presentation on the topic of 
“team-building”. The three participants of the chat have been nicknamed Cube, Soda, and Jazz. 
 
Cube, Soda, and Jazz are students with different majors, but from the same university. These 
students did not know each other before the experiment, and were randomly assigned into the 
chat group as a part of the study they were participating in.  
 
During their conversation, Cube, Soda, and Jazz first introduced themselves and then discussed 
about the contents and the sequences of their presentation.  
 
As in face-to-face conversations, online group discussion can be more or less harmonious. 
 
On the next page we will show you an excerpt of the online group discussion which occurred 
between Cube, Soda, and Jazz, as a part of their participation in a study. In this particular 
passage, Cube, Soda, and Jazz try to decide which media they want to use for their presentation 
and how they want to put the different contents into their presentation. 
 
 
 
Cube 
Ok ok Soda and Jazz I think we are stuck here now...  Lets leave that aside for a 
moment and think first about how we want to present the whole thing. Ok? 
Soda Prezi! 
Jazz Actually there are different possibilities: power point, overhead projector, prezi... 
Cube True you’re right Jazz... I prefer powerpoint. It’s great  
Soda Powerpoint? But that’s really old-fashioned! 
Jazz Yes you’re right Cube!! 
@ Soda: it’s a well-established presentation tool 
Soda I see… 
Jazz Then let’s use powerpoint?! How should we set it up? 
Cube Don’t know, Jazz, but it should really look professional   
What would fit with our topic of team-building and the contents of our presentation??  
Soda But why don’t we use prezi? I’m sure that it’s better and fancier. 
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Jazz What do you think about an arrow like structure?  
ex: solo-players -> method 1 -> method 2 -> method 3 -> ... -> team 
@ Soda: Probably we all can handle powerpoint well. 
Cube Hmmm... I don’t know about that, it seems so standard...  Let’s think a bit more 
about it... maybe we will find an inspiring image for team-building on google...? 
Soda Well then. Google our friend and helper… 
Id say that the best solution is to think on our own on something metaphorical like 
from the ego-fighter to the team  
Jazz What about that? img_1_team or that  img_2_team ?? 
Cube Not bad but I also found some: img_3_team or img_4_team  
Jazz Wow Cube image 3 is perfect for us!!!  
Soda I think it’s pretty boring.  I think it would be better if we created a picture on our own. 
Then we could also make it fit to my metaphor?! 
Cube I also prefer image 3 Jazz but I m not sure yet how we can connect that to all of the 
team-building methods we are supposed to include in our presentation?! Any other 
ideas? 
Jazz Yes we could place the problems in an outer circle. In the middle we write team. And 
in between we put the techniques...or something like that…then the solo-persons 
metaphorically speaking get together into their own team...how about that? 
Cube That’s awesome Jazz. Let s do it like that!! 
Soda That’s just what I suggested…   
Jazz Great, so glad we figured this out…now we can discuss the details and contents of 
each main idea in our presentation....  
Cube Right Jazz  
Soda Whatever... 
 
OBSERVED OSTRACISM       70 
 Appendix B 
Example Stimuli in Study 4. All stimuli were taken from the MR2 database (Strohminger, et al., 
2016). In the essentiality condition, participants were presented with faces that were different 
from their own ethnic background (i.e., if the participant was Caucasian, s/he saw Black and 
Asian faces). In the non-essentiality condition, the hairstyles of the stimuli persons were 
manipulated.  
 
Example Stimuli in the Essential Distinction Condition (Participant Caucasian): 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Example Stimuli in the Non-Essential Distinction Condition: 
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Appendix C 
Beginning of the Chat in the norm-violating and norm-consistent target condition in Study 5 
 
Chat Beginning (Norm-violating Target Condition): 
Cube Hey guys, I'm Cube, pleased to meet you! 
Jazz Hey Cube, I'm Jazz. How are you? 
Cube Doing great and you?  
Jazz Yeah, me too. Looking forward to work on this project with the two of you! 
Cube Same here. I’m sure it will be fun. 
Soda Can we skip the introductions and just get started? I’ve always hated working in 
groups.     
 
Chat Beginning (Norm-consistent Target Condition): 
Cube Hey guys, I'm Cube, pleased to meet you! 
Jazz Hey Cube, I'm Jazz. How are you? 
Cube Doing great and you?  
Jazz Yeah, me too. Looking forward to work on this project with the two of you! 
Cube Same here. I’m sure it will be fun. 
Soda I'm Soda, pleased to meet and work together with both of you too! 
 
 
